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Schools in the US are by and large safe environmentswhere millions of our children are secure and thrive.Outbreaks of fatal violence like the recent shootings at
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia
Tech) are, fortunately, rare. In fact, the odds of a student
losing his or her life to homicide are 50 times more likely
while off school grounds. Because of the extraordinary con-
sequences and societal shock waves caused by a low-proba-
bility mass casualty disaster in a school, this becomes one of
the “all hazards” that campuses must plan to face, albeit with
limited budgets and resources.
Events of this kind are inevitably—and understandably—
followed by analyses, investigations, and hearings examining
what went wrong and what can be done to avert such
catastrophes in the future. Too often, however, we fall into
the pattern of “planning for the last disaster,” forgetting that
a solid foundation of purposeful preparedness for a variety of
emergency or disaster scenarios will likely serve the greatest
good for the students, faculty, and staff who will face the next
unknown crisis in a school or on a campus.
This is not to say that we should bypass the opportunity to
learn from the lessons and unpredicted shortfalls that any
crisis reveals. Within weeks of the lethal violence at Virginia
Tech, the first round of meetings to analyze the catastrophe
was organized in Washington, DC. Officials from the Depart-
ments of Justice, Education, and Health and Human Ser-
vices, along with a range of key stakeholders, participated in
the discussions that focused on conditions or gaps that may
have contributed to or exacerbated the consequences of this
particular incident. The result of this after-incident analysis
was a series of specific actions that could reduce the risk for
a similar occurrence.
This is not the first time such discussions have taken place in
the aftermath of a particularly devastating school shooting,
however. For instance, the detailed report of the US Secret
Service’s Safe Schools Initiative, prepared after the 1999
Columbine High School shootings, contains comprehensive,
even groundbreaking, insights gleaned from thorough analy-
ses of this and prior notorious school shootings. Unfortu-
nately, until now the evidence-driven conclusions and rec-
ommendations of this 2002 report had gone largely
unnoticed. In fact, the US General Accounting Office’s May
2007 report, Status of [Public] School Districts’ Planning and
Preparedness, highlights the continuing shortfalls in the ca-
pacity of schools and campuses to protect and optimally care
for children and youth during and after a major disaster. It
seems that each new incident is referred to as a “wake-up
call,” and hopefully prompts new policies and resources to
prevent or mitigate similar occurrences in the future. Actual
follow-up is recurrently dismal, however, and reactions to the
event turn out to be more like pressing the snooze button on
an alarm clock.
One factor that undoubtedly reduces the likelihood of fol-
lowing new policies recommended in the aftermath of every
tragedy is that such incidents are actually highly uncommon,
clearly fitting into the classic category of “low probability,
high consequence” disasters. As is the case with disaster
planners in general, for campus officials it is always a chal-
lenge to prioritize the application of limited resources to
events that are legitimately rare. Consciously or not, a deci-
sion is often made to direct available resources to hazards that
are deemed more likely to occur.
That said, there are other scenarios—in addition to that of
the lone, mentally ill campus shooter—that would be
classified as highly unlikely, although not out of the ques-
tion. Such is the case for the possibility of specific target-
ing of a campus by organized terrorists. School sites and
facilities are known as “soft targets,” vulnerable to devas-
tating attacks because access is relatively simple, absolute
security virtually impossible, and the potential for terror-
induced, high degrees of society-wide grief and reaction
are ensured. Sadly, such a possibility cannot be ruled out,
as is suggested by events and discoveries over the past few
years including the following:
• In late 2001 a planned attack on a US school in Singa-
pore was thwarted by counterterrorism officials.
• More than 150 children were slain in a school in Beslan,
Russia, in 2004 before the perpetrators could be neutral-
ized by authorities. (The concern is, of course, that a
Beslan-style attack on a US school or campus cannot be
dismissed as a potential future threat and that we are
poorly positioned to respond to the specific needs of
children in a mass casualty incident.)
• In 2004 an Iraqi insurgent captured in Baghdad was
found to have had detailed plans and layouts of 8 school
districts across 6 US states.
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• The emergence of attacks on schools as a more main-
stream tool of warfare and terrorism: the intentional
targeting of a primary school in Afghanistan in 2006
and an explosives attack on a group of 20 children
playing soccer as well as a suicide bomb attack at a
college in Baghdad, both in February 2007. In March
2007 32 children and teachers were taken hostage in
Manila by armed gunmen.
• Writings by al Qaeda leaders have spoken to the mandate to
attack US citizens in general and children in particular.
Sulieman Abu Gheith, a close associate of al Qaeda leader
Osama Bin Laden, reportedly stated, “We have not reached
parity with [the Americans]. We have the right to kill 4
million Americans, 2 million of them children.”
Perhaps the point is that the United States cannot afford to
be sanguine about the potential dangers facing our children
and young people, even if the risk seems low. The risk for
occurrence must be balanced by considering the potential for
extreme, widespread, and crippling repercussions of such an
event occurring without adequate preparedness in place.
Just as with any other community facing potential hazards,
the goals of reducing campus violence and increasing
resiliency with respect to isolated shootings or terrorism
should include strategies that are focused on prevention,
mitigation, and response. Prevention, the sine qua non of
public health practice, should be the first priority in think-
ing about securing the safety of schools and campuses. This
exists across 2 realms: preventing the hazard itself from
occurring and taking steps to decrease the vulnerability of
those affected by a hazard. Balancing individual privacy
and an open academic environment versus the need to
share medical and mental health information for the good
of the student and the community will be a challenging
step in the current climate, as will be the issue of address-
ing the loopholes that allowed Cho Seung-Hui to acquire
the weapons he used for the murders at Virginia Tech.
With the proper judicial procedures in place, however,
educational institutions could have a far greater ability to
report, manage, and control students who may pose grave
danger to themselves or others.
The mitigation of disaster hazards is another set of chal-
lenges that includes the consideration of greatly enhanced
capacity to rapidly communicate warnings and emergency
instructions on a campus or in a school facility; much more
consistent and comprehensive disaster planning with lo-
cal, noncampus response agencies; and awareness training
for students, faculty, and staff.
The federal inquiry into the Virginia Tech tragedy high-
lighted many of the next steps that may serve to increase
the safety of students, faculty, and staff in the face of
life-threatening violence on campus. In fact, these recom-
mendations may prove to be extremely useful. By applying
the principles of good public health and response prac-
tices, we may reasonably hope to reduce the incidence of
campus shootings and mitigate the consequences of those
events we cannot predict or prevent.
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